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One of the most vexing issues for analysts and managers of property companies 
across Europe has been the existence and persistence of deviations of Net Asset 
Values of property companies from their market capitalisation. The issue has clear 
links to similar discounts and premiums in closed-end funds. The closed end fund 
puzzle is regarded as an important unsolved problem in financial economics 
undermining theories of market efficiency and the Law of One Price. Consequently, it 
has generated a huge body of research. Although it can be tempting to focus on the 
particular inefficiencies of real estate markets in attempting to explain deviations from 
NAV, the closed end fund discount puzzle indicates that divergences between 
underlying asset values and market capitalisation are not a ‘pure’ real estate 
phenomenon. When examining potential explanations, two recurring factors stand out 
in the closed end fund literature as often undermining the economic rationale for a 
discount – the existence of premiums and cross-sectional and periodic fluctuations in 
the level of discount/premium. These need to be borne in mind when considering 
potential explanations for real estate markets. 
There are two approaches to investigating the discount to net asset value in closed-end 
funds: the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ approach. The 
‘rational’ approach hypothesizes the discount to net asset value as being the result of 
company specific factors relating to such factors as management quality, tax liability 
and the type of stocks held by the fund. Despite the intuitive appeal of the ‘rational’ 
approach to closed-end fund discounts the studies have not successfully explained the 
variance in closed-end fund discounts or why the discount to net asset value in closed-
end funds varies so much over time. The variation over time in the average sector 
discount is not only a feature of closed-end funds but also property companies. 
This paper analyses changes in the deviations from NAV for UK property companies 
between 2000 and 2003. The paper present a new way to study the phenomenon 
‘cleaning’ the gearing effect by introducing a new way of calculating the discount 
itself. We call it “ungeared discount”. It is calculated by assuming that a firm issues 
new equity to repurchase outstanding debt without any variation on asset side. In this   3
way discount does not depend on an accounting effect and the analysis should better 
explain the effect of other independent variables.     4
Introduction 
One of the most vexing issues for analysts and managers of real estate companies has 
been the existence and persistence of deviations of Net Asset Values of real estate 
companies from their market capitalisation. The issue has clear links to similar 
discounts and premiums in closed-end funds. The closed end fund puzzle is regarded 
as an important unsolved problem in financial economics undermining theories of 
market efficiency and the Law of One Price. Consequently, it has generated a huge 
body of research. Although it can be tempting to focus on the particular inefficiencies 
of real estate markets in attempting to explain deviations from NAV, the closed end 
fund discount puzzle indicates that deviations between underlying asset values and 
market capitalisation are by no means a real estate phenomenon.  
Real estate companies typically have their real estate investment assets appraised 
annually by external consultants and the current aggregate value of the investment 
stock is shown in each company’s Annual Report and Accounts
1. Real estate 
companies thus provide, on an annual basis, an estimate of their total and net asset 
value. Due to this fact, it has long been recognized that the market capitalization of 
real estate companies varies from their stated net asset values. This topic has 
generated a body of research which has mainly investigated the cross-sectional 
differences in NAV deviation between companies. However, as we shall see below, 
explanatory models of cross-sectional variations in NAV deviation tend to have weak 
explanatory power
2. 
An often overlooked point is that there is a strong case for arguing that we should 
expect a priori a deviation between NAV and market capitalization. By investing in 
publicly traded collective real estate vehicles rather than directly acquiring real estate 
assets, the investor is investing in a vehicle which has different investment qualities 
than ownership of the underlying assets.  Compared to direct ownership, there are 
major differences in terms of liquidity, trading and price formation, financial 
structuring, search costs, management control, lot size, taxation and transaction costs 
inter alia.  Given these differences it would be surprising if NAV mirrored the market 
capitalization. Perhaps the enigma is that whilst real estate securities appear to be 
                                                 
1 Trading assets are held at the lower of cost and net realizable value. 
2 In a number of studies, adding the average sector discount to a model improves the explanatory 
power.  However, although this indicates that there common are factors causing deviations from NAV, 
NAV deviations are essentially being explained by the common NAV deviation.  This leaves the 
question of the cause of the common NAV deviation.   5
superior in terms of the qualities outlined above, they often tend to trade at discounts 
rather than premiums.  
Before discussing explanatory models of the discount to NAV below, we address 
some important methodological issues. As we shall note, the potential effect of a 
variable on the discount to NAV – discounts rather than premiums have typically 
been the focus of much research – is not always self-evident. For some of the 
variables cited below, it is possible to generate plausible arguments for a variable to 
cause both a positive and negative deviation from NAV. Further, variables may 
change in their implications depending upon market conditions. For instance, the 
market perception of high gearing may be favorable when asset values are expected to 
increase or interest rates are expected to decrease. On the other hand, when the 
opposite holds the market perception of high gearing may be unfavorable
3. Further, 
previous studies have found that portmanteau variables such as volatility or dividend 
yield have significant explanatory power. However, such variables are more likely to 
be a consequence of the same underlying causes of NAV deviation. Finally, it is also 
important to distinguish clearly between factors that explain cross-sectional variations 
in deviation from NAV between companies and changes in a sector’s deviation from 
NAV over time.  Essentially complete explanations need to be able to explain: 
i.  cross-sectional variation in deviations from NAV at a given point in time, 
ii.  the existence of premiums to NAV and 
iii.  fluctuations in the level of sector deviation from NAV over time.  
 
There have been two approaches to investigating the discount to net asset value in 
closed-end funds: the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ 
approach. The ‘rational’ approach hypothesizes the discount to net asset value as 
being the result of company specific factors relating to such factors as management 
quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held by the fund. Despite the intuitive 
appeal of the ‘rational’ approach to closed-end fund discounts the studies have not 
successfully explained the variance in closed-end fund discounts or why the discount 
to net asset value in closed-end funds varies so much over time.  
 
                                                 
3 For instance Clayton and McKinnon (2000) find that debt to equity ratio has significant explanatory 
power in the ‘downturn’ and is insignificant in the ‘upswing’ for US REITs   6
The second approach, which is generally described as the ‘noise trader’ model is 
associated with the work of Shiller (1989), De Long, Shleifer Summers and 
Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1990). The model is conceptually 
complex and posits the existence of two types of investors operating in the market; the 
rational and the noise traders. In essence, the operation of the noise traders provides 
an additional risk that is reflected in the value and returns of stocks. Not only does the 
noise trader model predict that security prices will diverge from fundamental values in 
the short run but that securities will be priced below fundamental values in 
equilibrium. The ‘noise trader’ approach has been applied to closed-end fund 
discounts by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) with some success. 
 
The Rational Explanations  
 
Unrealized Capital Gains Tax 
Closed-end fund net asset values are based of the market value of the securities they 
hold
4. If a fund holds securities that have appreciated, the sale of these securities 
would incur capital gains tax. Thus, the net asset value is not necessarily what 
shareholders would realize in the event of a fund being liquidated. In principle, the 
same argument can be applied to real estate companies. Many real estate investment 
companies have substantial unrealized reserves as part of their capital due to the 
upward movement in the value of their assets. Revenue from the sale of this property 
would be subject to taxation. Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1989) show that a 
reduction in contingent tax liability in the 1980s, due to changes in tax legislation, 
may have had led to some small reduction in individual real estate company 
discounts. However, they also show that substantial discounts exist even when post-
tax NAVs are calculated. Although Barkham and Ward (1999) do find that capital 
gains tax liability and size are statistically significant explanatory variables, the 
explanatory power was weak. Indeed there are a number of fundamental limitations to 
it as explanatory variable Dimson and Minio-Paluello (2002) point that the tax 
liability theory implies that on open-ending the NAV should decrease whilst in reality 
prices rise to NAV. They further point out that, in a rising market, increasing tax 
liabilities should widen the discount. Empirically there is little relationship. Crucially, 
                                                 
4 Management of closed-end funds is obliged to publish the market value of the securities they hold.   7
unrealized capital gains tax liabilities can only explain a discount to NAV whilst we 
have been able to observe premiums to NAV in real estate and mutual funds. Finally, 
and most obviously, whilst US REITS are not subject to capital gains tax, they do 
experience substantial deviations from NAV. 
 
Agency Costs - Insider ownership and Management Expenses  
High expenses represent dead-weight losses to the investor and might be expected to 
be correlated with high discounts. Historically, real estate companies in the UK have 
attracted considerable criticism from fund managers because their management 
expenses are alleged to be excessive. In the US, Capozza and Lee (1996) find some 
evidence that REIT discounts are correlated with expense ratios. In the closed end 
fund literature, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) find that higher management expense 
also contribute to a larger discount, although the relationship is masked by the 
collinearity of expenses with age of fund and cost of arbitrage. 
Malkiel argues that insider ownership may increase the discount because it reduces 
the likelihood that a fund will be taken over and liquidated at the net asset value. Real 
estate companies are frequently taken over by other companies but are rarely taken 
over in order to be liquidated. However insider ownership may reduce the prospect of 
a take-over bid being launched, the opportunity for profitable arbitrage and therefore 
widen the discount. On the other hand, if the directors of the company are important 
shareholders there is less likelihood of conflicts of interest between the non-directorial 
shareholders and the management. This would suggest lower discounts in firms with 
high insider ownership. 
 
Reputation 
Malkiel (1995) argues that a history of good performance may result in a management 
gaining a ‘premium rating’. Adams and Venmore-Rowland also assert that the market 
capitalization, and therefore the discount, is affected by the market’s perception of the 
entrepreneurial ability of the company’s management. It is very difficult to measure 
this type of factor but Malkiel (1995) suggests that some measure of achieved returns 
might be used as a proxy variable. An alternative approach to measuring manager 
reputation may be the proportion of manager remuneration that can is due to a 
performance bonus. This tends to contradict the ‘expensive management’ argument. 
Essentially the argument is that good performing managers tend to be expensive.    8
 
Size 
When reporting their financial position, real estate companies have each individual 
property appraised at the market value. If a company was forced to sell its entire 
stock, it could lead to a considerable addition to the normal flow of real estate in the 
market. Thus, the aggregate value of a company’s assets is not necessarily the sum of 
the values of the individual properties. It can be hypothesized that companies with 
larger holdings would face greater illiquidity and they would therefore have larger 
discounts. However size might affect discount in some other ways. Adams and 
Venmore-Rowland argue that for high value properties, access to capital acts as a 
barrier to entry into the market. They argue, along with Gau (1987) that restricted 
competition leads to the inefficient pricing of high value properties and to 
opportunities for larger institutions, with access to capital, to earn abnormal returns 
from the larger properties.  
In common with Barkham and Ward (1999) and Clayton and McKinnon (2001), 
Anderson, Conner and Liang (2001) in a cross-sectional study of NAV dispersion in 
2000 report that large REITs tend to have lower discounts. Although Capozza and Lee 
(1996) also find that small REITs have the largest discounts, they also find that small 
REITs appear to have the highest expense ratios and these two effects are not 
disentangled. Anderson et al (2001) speculate that the size effect is due to higher 
liquidity, better access to capital markets and economies of scale. They also suggest 
that there may be an upper limit when, for diversified funds, a conglomerate effect 
may emerge. This may be significant in the UK, where there is anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that large real estate companies that do not specialize may be penalized by 
large discounts.  
 
Leverage 
Debt can have an affect on the discount to NAV by virtue of the way in which the 
discount is calculated. For instance, a firm with no debt, book assets of $100 and 
shares valued at $80 in the market might have a discount of 20%. If the firm issues 
$40 of debt to repurchase $40 of equity, the book value of net assets will fall to $60 
but the market value of shares, ceteris paribus, will be $40 and the discount will 
increase to 33%.   9
Studies have tended to find that companies with high levels of leverage tend to have 
the higher discounts to NAV. Anderson et al (2000, 4) argue that 
“Higher leverage reduces financial and strategic flexibility, increases 
sensitivity to changes in market conditions and interest rates, and increases 
the volatility of earnings, all of which are penalized in the public REIT 
market.” 
  
As noted above, Clayton and McKinnon (2000) and Bond and Shilling (2003) have 
found that leverage is significant explanatory variable in some model specifications. 
Bond and Shilling (2003) examine the role of volatility as well as conventional factors 
in explaining discount to Net Asset Value discounts across a sample of European real 
estate companies. They find that there is a strong positive relationship between total 
volatility and the discount to NAV. The only statistically significant ‘rational’ 
explanatory variable is leverage suggesting that the two variables are (as expected) 
linked. However, even this finding changes when volatility is added to the model. 
They find evidence that both systematic and unsystematic risk is associated with 
increases in discount to NAV.  
 
Accounting Issues  
It was stated above that some real estate companies undertake real estate trading. Real 
estate designated for trading is held in the balance sheet at the lower of cost or market 
value. This implies that trading stock will never be shown in the accounts above its 
market value but it might sometimes be below it. If assets are recorded below their 
market value, the calculated NAV and therefore the discount will be reduced. 
Although the sample of companies included in this study have relatively small 
amounts of trading stock in their Balance Sheets, we include a variable that controls 
for this factor. 
 
Appraisal Smoothing 
A potential explanation for the deviations from NAV in the real estate market that is 
does not apply for closed end equity funds is mis-estimation of the values of the 
assets. For real estate both the appraisals and the market capitalization can be wrong. 
Noise theory implies mis-estimation of fundamental value by noise traders. However, 
as noted above, the processes by which prices are formed in the capital markets and 
appraisals are formed in real estate markets are different. The limitations of real estate   10
appraisals have been extremely well-documented (see Baum et al. 2002 for a full 
discussion). Essentially due to sluggish or smoothed responses to ‘news’, it is 
commonly held that valuations tend to underestimate the extent of changes in market 
values and tend to lag changes in market values. It has been convincingly documented 
that so-called appraisal smoothing is a rational process given the information 
uncertainties in the appraisal process (see Quan and Quigley, 1991). In contrast, 
assuming active markets, ‘news’ is incorporated in equity prices instantaneously. As a 
result, deviations may be partially explained by differences in timing of response to 
changing expectations by asset valuations compared to real estate share prices.  This 
may help to explain both premium and discounts to NAV. This also generates an a 
priori expectation that, in line with the price discovery literature, changes in NAV 
discounts/premiums should provide a leading indicator of the recorded performance 
of private markets. It is not surprising that Gentry, Jones and Myer (2004) find that 
deviations from NAV have some predictive power for future NAV growth. 
Additionally Barkham and Ward (1999) found that changes in property share prices 
‘Granger caused’ changes in net asset values. 
 
Market Segmentation  
 In real estate the long-term co-integration between private and public share markets 
is a well-established stylized fact. However, an interesting finding in studies of 
international closed end country funds is that prices of such funds are sometimes more 
closely related to the performance of investors’ domestic markets rather than the 
specific country (see Chang et al, 1995 and Bailey and Lim, 1992). This relates 
closely to the discussion of sentiment effects below. In real estate one hypothesis is 
that differences in clientele between trading environments can produce dislocations in 
pricing between private and public real estate markets. We would expect then that 
when private markets significantly outperform public markets, discounts should 
increase and vice versa. Another aspect of market segmentation is country effects on 
NAV deviations. In their study of European property companies, Bond and Shilling 
(2003) report national variations in the level of NAV deviation. Country dummies are 
significant for France and Benelux. They speculatively attribute lower discounts to 
NAV these countries to the actual or imminent existence of tax exempt vehicles in 
these markets.  However, they may also be due to market segmentation.   11
Recently Gemmill and Thomas (2002) provide a number of insights into the closed 
end discount puzzle which are associated with market segmentation. They 
hypothesize that it is as a function of arbitrage bounds and find that funds that are 
difficult to replicate tend to have higher discounts. If we regard real estate companies 
as special cases of closed end funds, the replication problems are practically 
insurmountable. In essence, in real estate markets since rational investors are less able 
to exploit the discrepancy between the asset values and share prices, there is potential 
for larger discounts. However, replication risk would not explain variations in 
deviations from NAV over time and the existence of premiums. In addition, Gemmill 
and Thomas find evidence to support the noise trader hypothesis. Using flows of 
money to mutual funds as an indicator of sentiment, they find that it is responsible for 
changes in the discount. However, they also find that (contrary to noise trader theory) 
funds with more systematic noise risk have lower discounts.   
 
Liquidity 
A commonly commended advantage of real estate shares relative to direct real estate 
holdings is their increased liquidity.  However, as documented in Bond et al (2003), 
there are a number of dimensions to liquidity. Most obviously, in terms of the ability 
to acquire and dispose of ‘product’, real estate securities offer the ability to gain 
relatively quick entry to or exit from real estate investment markets when expectations 
about the performance of real estate assets have changed. When expectations of real 
estate become bullish, we would expect discounts to close and/or premiums to emerge 
as investors achieve quick access to real estate markets, are able to acquire securities 
and affect prices rapidly. In contrast, there are institutional obstructions to rapid 
market entry in the private real estate markets which delay the emergence of evidence 
of market re-pricing. 
Delay and uncertainty in capital realization also imposes costs to investors. In the 
capital markets, Dimson and Hanke (2002) found that less liquid bond synthetics 
trade at discounts to the underlying assets despite having lower transaction costs. 
Looking at REITs in the period 1985-92, Benviste, Capozza and Sequin (2000) 
attempt to measure the gain from the increased liquidity of REITs relative to direct 
ownership. They estimate that securitizing direct property generates increases in value 
of between 12% and 22%. Cross-sectional and temporal variations in liquidity both   12
between and within direct and indirect real estate have been viewed as potential 
explanations as deviation from NAV.  
Clayton and McKinnon (2000) focus on market microstructures and liquidity as the 
explanation of cross-sectional variations in NAV deviations. Given problems 
associated with interpreting volume as a measure of liquidity, they use relative 
effective bid-ask spread as a liquidity proxy. Focusing on changes in premiums to 
NAV over time, they find that a common element in REIT liquidity is related to 
changes in NAV deviations. They conclude that the increase in spreads associated 
with convergence of NAV and market capitalization is consistent with the presence of 
informed investors in the market and is also consistent with the noise theory of 
departures from NAV. Building upon the limits to arbitrage explanations, there is also 
a body of work from the capital markets which focuses on limitations to short selling 
as causes of the deviations from fundamental value.  For instance, Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2002) and Jones and Lamont (2002) show hat when the costs of short selling 
are high, prices of closed end finds can deviate persistently from NAV.   
 
The Noise Trader Explanation 
 
The ‘noise trader’ approach identifies essentially, two types of capital market 
participants: rational and irrational. Rational market participants trade on the basis of 
unbiased estimates of future earnings derived from current information about 
fundamentals. Irrational investors, or noise traders trade not on information about 
fundamentals but on market sentiment. Such sentiment might be due to the advice of 
popular investment commentators or simple trading rules or might even emerge 
spontaneously. When asset prices are influenced by sentiment in efficient markets, 
rational investors engage in arbitrage and in so doing ensure that prices converge to 
the levels warranted by current information. Irrational investors can be active in 
efficient markets but they will have little impact on price because of arbitrage by 
rational investors. However the efficient market view contrasts sharply with the 
arguments based on noise traders (Cuthbertson, 1996). Within the noise trader view, 
the influence of noise traders is asserted to be pervasive and unlikely to be arbitraged 
away by rational investors. The reason for this is that rational investors have finite 
horizons and noise trader sentiment is both stochastic and systematic. 
   13
Research on the influence of irrational market participants has been carried out by 
Shiller (1989; 1990) Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Kirman (1993) However in this 
paper we are concerned with a model of the of the interaction of noise traders and 
rational investors in asset markets put forward by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann (1990), DSSW hereafter. DSSW argue that when asset prices are forced 
above those warranted by fundamentals because of positive or negative noise trader 
sentiment, mis-pricing will not be fully arbitraged away. Three assumptions are 
crucial to the model. 
The first assumption is that rational investors are risk averse and have finite horizons. 
There are four reasons why rational investors may have finite horizons. First, the 
performance of fund managers (rational investors) is assessed on a short term, 
generally quarterly, basis. Second, individuals who hold shares often have a need for 
liquidity. Third, if cash or assets are borrowed, the cumulative cost of the transaction 
increases the longer the trade. Fourth, short sales are difficult and costly in the long 
term. Thus, rational investors are concerned with the interim resale price of assets the 
unpredictability of which is exacerbated by the presence of noise traders in the 
market. 
A second assumption of the DSSW approach is that noise trader sentiment is 
stochastic and cannot be predicted by rational investors. Therefore, rational investors, 
concerned as they are with the interim resale price of assets, have to take into account 
not only fundamental risk but also the risk that noise traders may have driven prices 
further away from fundamentals during the holding period. This risk exists even if 
noise traders are not, at the start of the holding period, excessively optimistic or 
pessimistic. Rational traders might believe that prices will return to their fundamental 
values in the long run but stochastic noise trader sentiment may disturb the 
relationship between prices and fundamentals in the interim. 
A third assumption of the DSSW model is that noise trader risk, that is excess 
volatility and the divergence of price form fundamentals, is correlated across assets. 
In other words, noise trader risk is systematic. Were noise trader risk not market wide 
it would not be priced, for the same reason that idiosyncratic fundamental risk is not 
priced.  
 
The DSSW model has a number of implications not least for the explanation of 
financial market anomalies. The implication that has most concern for this paper is   14
that the presence of noise traders in financial markets results in a permanent deviation 
of price from fundamental value. This is the result of rational traders having to bear 
noise trader risk as well as fundamental risk. DSSW note that, in most cases it is 
difficult to observe this mis-pricing because it is difficult to correctly estimate 
fundamental values. However fundamental values can be estimated and are indeed 
given in the case of closed end mutual funds. DSSW thus argue that the noise trader 
hypothesis explains why closed end funds typically trade at a discount to NAV. 
This suggestion is elaborated on and investigated by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) 
(hereafter LST). LST suggest that there are actually four parts to the puzzle about 
closed-end fund discounts and that the noise trader approach is more successful in 
explaining this four part puzzle than the ‘rational approach’. Briefly the four part 
puzzle is: 1) closed end funds typically start at a premium to NAV; 2) after listing, 
closed-end funds move to a discount within a few months of trading; 3) the discount 
on closed end funds are subject to wide variation over time, and; 4) discounts shrink 
when fund are open ended or liquidated. To explain the four-part puzzle LST add one 
further assumption to the DSSW model, that of differing clienteles. LST argue that 
closed end fund stock is held predominately by small investors (equated by LST with 
noise traders) whilst the underlying assets are held mainly by institutional investors, 
(equated with rational investors).  
The LST argument is that closed-end fund shares are subject to noise trader risk 
whereas the assets held by closed end funds are not. Thus closed end fund shares are 
riskier than closed end fund assets, have to earn a higher rate of return in equilibrium 
and are therefore priced below net asset value (part 2 of the puzzle). The initial 
premium (part 1 of the puzzle) arises from that smart investors taking advantage of 
noise traders by creating closed end funds at times of positive noise trader sentiment. 
The variation in time of the discount (part 3 of the puzzle) is due to changes in noise 
trader expectations. Thus, discounts to NAV are a sentiment indicator.  
The LST approach can be applied directly to real estate companies. However, the 
additional assumption of LST that shares and assets are held by differing clienteles is 
worth exploring in the case of real estate companies. The logic of the model dictates 
that the investors who trade the assets owned by real estate companies differ from the 
investors who trade the shares of the real estate companies. If similar investors traded 
both the assets and the shares of real estate companies, the same sentiment changes 
would affect both and they would be equally risky. The assets held by real estate   15
companies are office, retail, and industrial real estate. These types of real estate are 
primarily traded by professional and institutional investors. Real estate company 
shares provide the main vehicle by which small investors can take a position in the 
real estate market when sentiment is positive
5.  
However, Barkham and Ward (1999) tested a number of specific implications of the 
noise trader hypothesis. Testing the hypothesis that positive (negative) noise trader 
sentiment will reduce (increase) the discount to NAV over time but the discount will 
fluctuate around a long run average determined by the risk premium, required by 
rational participants for bearing noise trader risk, they developed a vector-error-
correction model in which the restriction of cointegration is imposed
6. They found 
that net asset values respond, but not rapidly, to movements in property shares by 
moving back to the equilibrium relationship. They further hypothesized that the 
deviation from net asset value will be correlated with other indicators of sentiment not 
related to real estate, for instance expectations about inflation, consumer confidence 
and industrial optimism. They find that consistent with the noise trader hypothesis 
that the MMI index of inflation expectations and the CBI index of industrial optimism 
are both significant influences on the discount to net asset value. In addition, Barkham 
and Ward (1999) found that their ‘rational’ model had weak explanatory power (R
2 - 
15%) and the inclusion of the average sector discount improved the explanatory 
power of the model. This provided further support for a sentiment explanation of the 
NAV discount. Barkham and Ward (1999) also report that, consistent with the noise 
trader hypothesis, national sentiment indexes have a negative relationship with the 
level of discount. Levels of discount will be highly correlated across funds. 
In summary, previous ‘economic’ explanations of deviations from real Net Asset 
Values for real estate companies have had limited explanatory power. It is often 
overlooked that such deviations can be interpreted as a rational outcome of the 
different, particularly in terms of liquidity, characteristics of the two ‘routes’ into real 
estate investment. Whilst studies of the closed-end fund puzzle strongly suggest that it 
is not a ‘pure’ real estate phenomenon, the ways that appraisals and prices are formed 
in the real estate markets adds further complications. Deviations may occur because 
of  
                                                 
5 Of course, more sophisticated investors can simulate property returns with a portfolio of other assets 
(Ward and Henry, 1995). 
6 This restriction, of course, is not based on an assumption of a cointegrating relationship but on the 
demonstration of this relationship.   16
−  Differences between price formation processes in securities markets and real 
estate markets 
−  Biased appraisal of real estate assets 
−  The effects of gearing  
 
The drivers of price formation such as sentiment/noise trading in securities markets 
will vary over time. Additionally, for a number of variables e.g. gearing, better 
liquidity, the implications will create different expectations in different market 
conditions. As a result, explanations of deviations from NAV are likely to be 
inherently complex and multi-dimensional. From a modeling perspective, it should 





Previous studies that attempted to analyze discount to NAV in different countries 
have been hampered by differences in accounting and tax rules; our sample is based 
only on U.K. listed companies in the property sector of the London Stock Exchange. 
The data used in this paper comes from three different sources: 
o  all data from Balance Sheets and Income Statements have been collected from 
Hemscott and are actual for the period from 1999 to 2004;  
o  stock prices, volumes, dividend yields, total return and total return indexes and 
other Stock Market data are from DataStream Thomson Financial; 
o  direct property market data are from IPD (actual data) and IPF (forecast). 
 
Several steps were involved in the identification of the sample. Initially, the sample 
covered all listed companies recorded in FTSE All Share Index classified by 
Hemscott as “Real Estate Holding & Development”. Companies classified as 
“Property Agencies” have not been included. Three firms were excluded because data 
were not available.  
Hemscott contains standardized balance sheets for U.K. companies: the data 
contained detailed company information on all listed properties companies in UK. 
The final sample is composed of 26 companies and accounts for 92% of the market 
capitalization of the listed real estate sector. The criterion adopted for the final subset   17
of companies required every company to have four years of data available. Hence the 
sample is reduced to 104 observations after eliminating total returns not available on 
Datastream. All data refer to the end of fiscal year for each company, so discount is 
calculated in different periods. Details of the companies can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
De-gearing the Discount 
 
One important way that our study differs from previous work is that we include a 
different definition for discount to NAV (DISCDEF). Discount to NAV, as typically 
defined in the literature, is calculated on the following basis: 
 
DISC = 100 * (NAV - MC) / NAV          [ 1] 
 
where: 
NAV = Net asset value  
MC = Market capitalization. 
 
The property company NAVs are estimated at the end of the fiscal year and are 
provided by Hemscott. Market capitalization is the total value of shares (Price * 
numbers of issued shares) at the end of the fiscal year (see Appendix 2 for details of 
inter-company variations in date of fiscal year.) 
 
Previous studies on discount to NAV demonstrate that there is a positive correlation 
between debt and discount. Debt can have an effect by virtue of the way in which the 
discount is calculated. For instance, a firm with no debt, book assets of £100 and 
shares valued at £80 in the market might have a discount of 20%. If the firm issues 
£40 of debt to repurchase £40 of equity, the book value of net assets will fall to £60 
but the market value of shares, ceteris paribus, will be £40 and the discount will 
increase to 33%. So the analysis of discounts is always affected by a gearing effect 
independently from its genuine relevance in explaining a deviation.  
 
A alternative way to study the phenomenon is to ‘clean’ the gearing effect by 
introducing a new way of calculating the discount itself. We call it “ungeared 
discount”. It is calculated by assuming that a firm issues new equity to repurchase 
outstanding debt without any variation on asset side. In this way discount does not   18
depend on an accounting effect and the analysis should better explain the effect of 
other independent variables. A simple example may better explain the rationale. 
 
We consider a company with a market asset value equal to £100 and no debt, so NAV 
is equal to £100. Assuming a stock market value equal to £80 the traditional discount 
is: 
Table 1: Illustration of Discount to NAV (No debt) 
  A 
market asset value (A)  100 
debt value (D)  0 
  
NAV 100 
market cap (MC)  80 




DISCa = 100 * (NAV - MC) / NAV = 100 * (100 - 80) /100 = 20% 
 
If the company decides to issue debt of £12 (column B) and buy back equity at market 
value, there is no change on the asset side but a new financial structure: equity has 
been reduced by 12 and is now £68 and debt is equal to £12. Assuming the market 
does not consider any tax shield effect (further discussed below), the traditional 
discount (see column B in table below) will be 
 
DISCb = 100 * (NAV - MC) / NAV = 100 * (88 - 68) /88 = 22.7% 
 
Table 2: Illustration of Discount to NAV (with debt) 
  A B 
market asset value (A)  100  100 
debt value (D)  0  12 
    
NAV 100  88 
market cap (MC)  80  68 
 







We see that the discount has been reduced only through an accounting effect without 
any change in the asset values. This provides a partial explanation of the strong 
positive relationship between NAV discount and gearing.  
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Our definition of “Ungeared” discount to NAV incorporates the total asset and total 
liability values rather than the net asset value and thus can be estimated by the 
following formula: 
 




UNGDISC   = 100 * (NAV– MC) / (NAV + Debt)          [3] 
   
Debt = Debt value as reported in the balance sheet 
 
Table 3: Illustration of Ungeared Discount to NAV 
  A B 
market asset value (A)  100  100 
debt value (D)  0  12 
    
NAV 100  88 
market cap (MC)  80  68 
discount to NAV  20% 23% 
    
enterprise value (MC + D)  80  80 
    
Ungeared NAV (NAV + D)  100  100 
    
Ungeared discount  20%  20% 
 
In this way the financial structure does not directly affect the discount to NAV for 
purely accounting reasons. This new formula allows a more effective approach to 
evaluating the effects of other determinants of NAV discount and at the same time 





In the following part we present some basic descriptive statistics on discount to NAV 
(DISC) in our sample. As noted earlier, we investigate deviations from NAV for the 
UK listed real estate sector for the period 2000-2003. It is clear from Exhibit 1 that 
there has been a substantial sector discount over this period without any significant 
variation at the aggregate level. Although the cross-sectional variation in the discount 
has remained fairly stable over the four year period, it has been substantial. For   20
instance, in 2003 St Mowden Properties were trading at a 37% premium to NAV, 
whilst London Merchant Securities was trading at a 66% discount to NAV.  
 
Table 4: Discounts of UK Property Companies, 2000-2003 
Min 0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.37 -0.37 0.16 0.00 0.02
Max 0.69 0.58 0.54 0.66 0.54 0.69 0.60 0.22
Average 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.39 0.28 0.08
Median 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.39 0.28 0.07
STD. Dev. 0.16           0.17      0.13      0.20      0.18           0.12           0.14               0.05              
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 Min Max Average STD. Dev.
Ashtenne Holdings  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.02              
British Land Co  0.40 0.34 0.35 0.49 0.34 0.49 0.39 0.06              
Brixton 0.27 0.32 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.25 0.07              
Capital & Regional  0.36 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.03              
CLS Holdings  0.38 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.02              
Derwent Valley Holdings  0.15 0.35 0.44 0.17 0.15 0.44 0.28 0.12              
Development Securities  0.16 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.02              
Freeport 0.05 -0.14 0.23 0.37 -0.14 0.37 0.13 0.19              
Great Portland Estates  0.36 0.30 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.36 0.27 0.07              
Hammerson 0.34 0.40 0.36 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.32 0.08              
Helical Bar  0.09 0.05 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.28 0.11 0.10              
Land Securities Group  0.32 0.23 0.23 0.39 0.23 0.39 0.29 0.07              
Liberty International  0.39 0.41 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.41 0.35 0.07              
London Merchant Securities  0.38 0.52 0.51 0.66 0.38 0.66 0.52 0.10              
Marylebone Warwick Balfour  0.40 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.29 0.48 0.40 0.07              
Minerva 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.44 0.08 0.44 0.24 0.13              
NHP 0.42 0.46 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.46 0.31 0.14              
Pillar Property  0.23 0.12 0.14 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.08              
Quintain Estates & Developme 0.46 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.06              
Shaftesbury 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.24 0.05 0.30 0.17 0.11              
Slough Estates  0.31 0.39 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.31 0.09              
St Modwen Properties  0.07 0.22 0.07 -0.37 -0.37 0.22 0.00 0.22              
Tops Estates  0.69 0.58 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.69 0.60 0.06              
Town Centre Securities  0.46 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.43 0.03              
Warner Estate Holdings  0.31 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.04              
Workspace Group  0.10 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.13                
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Research Methodology and Results 
 
Some of the major decisions made by researchers into the closed end fund discount 
concern the choice of variables, the framing of the hypotheses in unambiguous terms 
and the choice of statistical methods. As the discussion above suggests, there is scope 
for different researchers to select different subsets of explanatory variables to support 
diametrically opposing hypotheses. One of the tasks taken on in the present study is to 
reduce as much as possible the subjective bias in choosing the number and 
combination of explanatory variables. We therefore determined to identify in as 
objective a manner as possible the number of different dimensions of the variables 
required to explain the discounts of the selected companies. One decision we made 
early on was to adopt the ungeared discount as the variables we wished to explain. As 
the graph of the discounts in the sample period shows, the variation from one year to 
the next is minimized if we adopt the ungeared discount and will therefore be more 
likely to be explained by a constant model. As the results will show below, the result 
is that the model appears to be stable over the sample period and no adjustment is 
made for the period in which the sample accounting ratios are selected. 
 
By using principal components, we derived scores for the sets of potential explanatory 
variables. Figure in the Appendix 4 illustrates the “scree” plot of the principal 
components. Conventionally, the researchers select the number of principal 
components depending on the shape of the “scree”. Often there is a shape of an elbow 
beyond which further components contribute little explanatory power of the 
variability in the data. In this case however, we note two points: it is not obvious from 
the plot how many dimensions are required to describe the data set and in any case the 
important decision is not how many dimensions are represented in the data set but 
how complex is the data structure required to explain the variation in ungeared 
discounts. We therefore extracted the principal component scores and regressed the 
ungeared discount against successive larger number of principal component scores. 
After six principal components were included, there was no evidence that further data 
were required. (See Table  5). The F-test rejected the hypothesis that 5 principal 
components were adequate since plainly the sixth added significant explanation to the 
regression. However equally obviously, the seventh principal component did not   22
improve the regression at all. In terms of our approach, we therefore decided that we 
were looking for up to six accounting variables that would be used in a regression on 
the ungeared discount. 
 
Table 5: ANOVA Test of Regression of Principal Components 
Regression  F-Test of smaller 
regression 
Probability 
Ungeared Discount on 6 
principal components 
Against 5 variables 
F=72.189 
0.0000000017 
Ungeared Discount on 7 
principal components 




To select the variables, we eliminated some obvious pairs of variables that would 
cause multi-collinearity. For example there were three size variables, SIZEEV, 
SIZEMV and SIZETA as can be seen in scatter-matrix (Figure 1), they are highly 
correlated and would be likely to cause problems if included in the same regression. 
We therefore included only the SIZEEV variable. It should be noted that these ratios, 
like many accounting ratios are significantly non-normal in their distributions. Further 
work might be required to transform some of the accounting data into more tractable 
forms for the regression.   23
Figure 1: Scatter matrix of Size variables 
























Starting from the reduced set of 49 variables we performed an all-possible subset 
regression, the summary of which is shown in Figure 2.    24
Figure 2: Summary of All Possible Sub-Sets 
Regressions
 
The diagram summarizes the specific variables that best contribute to the explanatory 
power of the regression. At the top of the diagram, there are 10 variables. As one 
moves downwards, the number of variables are reduced until at the bottom there is 
only one variable that show any explanatory power at all. The interpretation of the 
output from the all-possible subset regression is difficult because it correctly shows 
that different combinations of some variables are equally valid as other combinations. 
After some trial and error we selected the eight variables FIXTAS, MEANRT1Y, 
BET3Y, DY, NAVGEAR, ROE, LOGINST and NOSALCOM. We therefore 
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Table 6: Regression Model of Ungeared Discount 
 
Estimate Std. Error t value  Pr (>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.361 0.103 3.5 0.0007 ***
FIXTTAS 0.124 0.075 1.65 0.102
MEANRT1Y -0.141 0.026 -5.5 0.00000026 ***
BET3Y 0.071 0.026 2.73 0.007 **
DY 1.79 0.485 3.69 0.0003 ***
NAVGEAR -0.048 0.017 -2.78 0.006 **
ROE -1.254 0.312 -4.02 0.0001 ***
LOGINST -0.023 0.007 -3.2 0.002 **
NOSALCOM -0.22 0.043 -5.117 0.00000136 ***
Signif. 0 `***' 0.001 `**'
0.01 `*' 0.05 `.'
Residual standard error: 0.07 on 108 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.54,     Adjusted R-Squared 0.51 
F-statistic: 15.82 on 8 and 108 DF,  p-value: 3.132e-15 
Standard error: 0.5395  
 
The results seem intuitively acceptable. An interesting variable is NOSALCOM. This 
represents the proportion of managers salaries that is paid by bonus. We hypothesized 
that companies would offer better salaries to better managers but offer rewards 
conditional upon performance. The coefficient here is significant at the 1% level and 
has the expected sign. The more that directors earn in performance related rewards, 
then the lower tends to be their company’s discount. Gearing is also significant at the 
5% level. We noted above that we felt that gearing was an ambiguous variable and 
could be viewed as a positive and negative dependent upon market conditions and its 
level. In our sample period, an increase in gearing tends to be associated with a fall in 
the discount. However, it is possible that this finding could be reversed in different 
market conditions. 
 
The common “portmanteau” variables also emerged as significant. In common with 
other studies, we found that dividend yield was significant and had the normal 
positive sign - the higher the dividend yield, the higher the discount. However, a high 
dividend yield may signal a whole raft of issues with a company. Like a high discount 
to NAV, a high dividend yield is likely to be a result of the factors that drive NAV 
discount rather than an explanatory per se. Likewise, the risk of the company as   26
measure by the three year beta (BET3Y) is also significant. The co-efficient has 
expected sign and it is clear that higher systematic risk is associated with higher 
discounts. Other indicators of good performance such as annual returns and return on 
equity (ROE) have significant explanatory power and the expected negative signs. As 
expected, they indicate that the better the historic performance, the lower the discount 






This is not the final word on UK property company discounts, indeed it can be seen 
only as a small contribution into possible explanations. As we can see from the 
research, the property company discounts have been very variable in recent years but 
only for some companies. It is likely that some of the volatility in the discounts is 
caused by the decisions being made by the Boards in preparation for the conversion to 
UK REITs that are likely to be established in the next two years. But these decisions 
are rarely clearly revealed in the accounting data and despite our collecting 
information about the corporate governance of each company, that information shed 
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Appendix 1: Property Companies 
 
 





Ashtenne Holdings 138.05 34.83 198
British Land Co 4,372.00 497.70 701
Brixton 879.22 98.30 39
Capital & Regional 419.73 39.46 231
CLS Holdings 314.45 69.30 178
Derwent Valley Holdings 539.07 47.90 24
Development Securities 146.30 32.24 58
Freeport 149.08 16.26 355
Great Portland Estates 527.23 63.80 41
Hammerson 2,195.00 223.80 218
Helical Bar 285.30 54.57 18
Land Securities Group 6,197.82 1,285.80 1,677
Liberty International 2,893.54 362.10 795
London Merchant Securities 670.73 60.24 81
Marylebone Warwick Balfour Group 79.68 227.29 1,666
Minerva 469.35 61.44 30
NHP 534.10 171.89 6,128
Pillar Property 652.13 32.20 35
Quintain Estates & Development 660.49 60.48 170
Shaftesbury 459.41 41.44 12
Slough Estates 2,002.39 325.90 559
St Modwen Properties 384.06 122.78 200
Tops Estates 165.09 29.59 15
Town Centre Securities 183.17 24.59 64
Warner Estate Holdings 249.17 44.37 59
Workspace Group 354.95 51.07 145
Average 996.98 156.90 527
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Appendix 2: End of fiscal year  
 
 
31st March 10                            
30th June 4                              
30th September 2                              
30th November 1                              
31st December 9                              
Company End of fiscal Year
Ashtenne Holdings PLC 31/12
British Land Co PLC 31/3
Brixton PLC 31/12
Capital & Regional PLC 31/12
CLS Holdings PLC 31/12
Derwent Valley Holdings PLC 31/12
Development Securities PLC 31/12
Freeport PLC 30/6
Great Portland Estates PLC 31/3
Hammerson PLC 31/12
Helical Bar PLC 31/3
Land Securities Group PLC 31/3
Liberty International PLC 31/12
London Merchant Securities PLC 31/3
Marylebone Warwick Balfour Group PLC 30/6
Minerva PLC 30/6
NHP PLC 30/9
Pillar Property PLC 31/3
Quintain Estates & Development PLC 31/3
Shaftesbury PLC 30/9
Slough Estates PLC 31/12
St Modwen Properties PLC 30/11
Tops Estates PLC 31/3
Town Centre Securities PLC 30/6
Warner Estate Holdings PLC 31/3
Workspace Group PLC 31/3   32
Appendix 3: Definition of Explanatory Variables 
  
All independent variables are defined as follows. Data from Balance Sheet and 
Income Statement, if not differently specified, are from Hemscott; data from stock 
markets, if not differently specified, are from DataStream Thomson Financial. 
 
ABRE12IN and ABRE36IN 
Those variables represent the abnormal return for shares in 12 or 36 month, 
calculated at the end of fiscal year. All return are calculated as geometric 
mean. 
 
ABRE12IN = Share Mean return Last 12 Months - Mean return FTSE REAL 
ESTATE Index LAST 12 Month Total Return  
 
ABRE36IN = Share Mean return Last 36 Months - Mean return FTSE REAL 




ADMINRAT is administrative costs as a percentage of the total value of the 
balance sheet and is calculated as: 
 




AUDITRAT is audit costs as a percentage of the total value of the balance 
sheet and is calculated as: 
 
AUDITRAT= (Sum of audit remuneration, other fees charged by auditors, 
political donations, charitable cash donations, non-cash comm. involvement, 




It is the natural logarithm of total compensation for all executive directors in 
the last available fiscal year. The higher, the more are paid the executive 
directors, independently from company’s size or value. 
 
BET3Y 
It is Beta coefficient calculated in a three years horizon on monthly base, using 
FTSE ALL SHARE total return index. 
 
CAPGEAR 
It is provided by DataStream Thomson Financial and represents leverage ratio. 
 
CAPGEAR = Total debt % / total capital 
 
 
COMHFDI   33
It is the measures of diversification/concentration calculated as are 
Hirschman-Herfindahl
7 indices that are commonly used in industrial 
economics to measure monopoly power. It represent the concentration of 
compensations for executive directors. The higher the index, the higher is the 









It is the ratio between fixed asset and total asset. It represents the percentage 
of developments or properties held as inventory for trading purposes: their 
value is calculated as cost. A lower ratio indicates a low level of investments 




It is natural logarithmic of the total market value owned by shareholders with 
share’s stake higher than 3%. It is calculated using market value at the end of 
each fiscal year but maintaining share’s stake as calculated at the end of 2003. 
This ratio indicates concentration of shares by institutional shareholder: high 




It is the total return of stock, considering capital variation and dividend. It is 








It is the ratio between Total Borrowings (Long term and Short term debts) and 




It is the ratio between every kind or remuneration except fixed salary and the 
total salary received by executive directors. Numerator includes bonus, 
options and other benefits as reported by Hemscott. It refers only to the last 
year available (2003).  
                                                 
7 The index first acquired the name of Orris Herfindahl from work on energy in the 1950s and that of 
Albert Hirschman from work on foreign trade patterns.   34
The higher the ratio, the higher is the alignment of interest between executive 
directors and shareholders because their salary is more dependent on 
company’s performance. Another interpretation is that best managers prefer to 
be paid according company’s performance, so the higher the ratio the better 








It represents the size of the firm as market total asset value: it is calculating as 
market value of equity plus value of debt. 
 




It represents the size of the firm as market value of equity: 
 




It represents the size of the firm as total asset value:  
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Appendix 4: Principal components analysis 
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